Preprint · SSRN Electronic Journal · September 20, 2019

Optimization of Decision-Making on Financing of Means of Cyber Security in the Conditions of the Fissile Counteraction to the Attacking Party

Берик Бахытжанович Ахметов, Valeriy Lakhno, Лазат Муктаровна Кыдыралина, V. Malyukov, Timur Kartbayev, B. Tussupova

Abstract

The article is devoted to the current problem of acceptance of an optimal solution on financing of means of cyber security in the conditions of the fissile counteraction to the burglars of informatization objects. The model is developed for the decision support system of financing process in the means of cyber security for informatization object. The model is based on use of tools of a game theory. The received decision gives the chance to estimate efficiently the risks in processes of financing of means of cyber security of informatization objects. The model differs from the existing approaches by the decision of a bilinear multistep quality game with several terminal surfaces. There was found a solution of a bilinear multistep quality game with the dependent movements. On the basis of the decision of a single-step game received by application of a method of the dominance developed for the infinite antagonistic games there were made conclusion about the risks for players. Results of a computing experiment within the program realization of decision support system in the sphere of financing of means of cyber security of an informatization object are described. At the same time any ratios of the parameters describing financing process are considered, despite the attacking party (hackers) financial actions.

Information and Cyber SecurityCybersecurity and Information SystemsGame Theory and Applicationsdecision support systemgame theoryhackers

Optimization of Decision-Making on Financing of Means of Cyber Security in the Conditions of the Fissile Counteraction to the Attacking Party

Abstract

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